Amonth after it was hit by an earthquake and a tsunami, Japan is still battling to contain a nuclear crisis triggered by the disaster. Low-level radioactive dust and seawater have been detected in countries in the Asia-Pacific. While it is too early to sum up the lessons of the disaster, it is clear responses to the nuclear threat must be transparent and rational.
The Japanese government has been criticised by both its own people and others in the region for its chaotic and ineffective response to the crisis. On April 6, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano admitted to giving "insufficient explanation" to neighbouring countries about the leak of radiation in seawater.
This is a reminder that the timely, accurate and open disclosure of information is critically important in any disaster response plan and international co-ordination efforts; it also helps to prevent panic spreading.
In this case, the government's tardiness and confusion in relaying accurate information has tarnished Japan's global image as a prudent and trustworthy country. One after another, its guarantees of safety - "there is no risk", "it's not a big problem" - have turned out to be unreliable. This has dealt a serious blow to confidence in the government, which may prove to be the more enduring damage than harm to the environment.
There are two aspects to disclosure of information in a crisis: how to obtain first-hand information about the crisis, and how to disseminate it to the public and all affected parties.
Shortly after the massive earthquake on March 11, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tepco) assured the public it was succeeding in efforts to keep reactors safe at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, and Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan said the plant posed no danger of nuclear leaks. Yet, that night, the Japanese government ordered the evacuation of residents within 3 kilometres of the plant, and over the next few days gradually extended the evacuation zone to 30 kilometres. These contradictory actions were not just the result of technical difficulties, but also reflected a lack of willingness to act promptly.
Yet another problem was the accurate dissemination of information. Tepco was several hours late in reporting the problem with reactor No1 to the government and to the public. The company's attempt at the press conference to downplay the severity of the situation also angered the people. Even the International Atomic Energy Agency was not promptly informed about developments, at one point telling the media it was urgently seeking information about reported explosions at the plant.
According to a law introduced in 1999, the Japanese government should take the lead in handling a nuclear crisis in the event of an emergency. A government management task force headed by the prime minister should be formed, and it would direct and co-ordinate the responses of government agencies.
On March 15, the Japanese government set up an ad hoc joint headquarters, headed by Kan, to oversee the crisis, with 20 government officials moving into Tepco's Tokyo office. But the on-site handling of the crisis remained under Tepco's command. The arrangement made it difficult for Kan to co-ordinate relief work by the Self-Defence Forces, the police force and the fire services department.
And only on April 3 did Edano announce plans to set up an independent committee to investigate the crisis, which will subject both the relevant government departments and Tepco to scrutiny.
The crisis in Japan holds lessons for other countries. This is especially true for China, a latecomer in nuclear power development; it cannot afford to be a mere observer of the disaster.
In a crisis, a government is obliged to disclose timely information to its people, and the media, non-governmental organisations and international agencies have the right to monitor the government, and must have the channels to do so.
Japan leads most other countries in the soundness of its legal system and institutions. And in this crisis, ordinary Japanese citizens, businesses and NGOs have stepped up where the government has fallen short. In these areas, China has a long way to go.
Outsiders may criticise the Japanese government for its inadequate response to the disaster, and the murky lines of responsibility between government and the nuclear power company. But at least some regulations are in place: a law on nuclear material, nuclear fuel material and reactors enacted in 1957, and a law on nuclear emergency response in 1999.
By contrast, China, though it is a member of the IAEA, still has many legal "blanks" to fill out in terms of nuclear and radiation safety.
Since Japan's disaster, China has ordered a comprehensive safety review of its nuclear facilities, including those under construction and those yet to be approved. Rightly so, as China's nuclear industry needs to be overhauled. Information on the safety inspections of nuclear plants should be made known beyond the industry, while safety planning in the industry should also be a transparent process. Furthermore, the people should have a say in the drafting of laws regulating the industry - the atomic energy act and the nuclear safety act.
In the face of an energy crisis and climate change, and before we can effectively use solar power and other kinds of natural energy, we cannot do without nuclear energy. The key is how to use it safely. Nuclear phobia and blind optimism are both unacceptable. To avoid taking such extreme positions, we need reason, and open debate, supported by science and sound governance.
No one can guarantee nuclear accidents will not happen, but technological advances and improved institutions can help us harness nuclear energy safely.
This article is provided by Caixin Media, and the Chinese version of it was first published in Century Weekly magazine www.caing.com